经典重译

经典重译之股票大作手回忆录(433)

原文(463)： The promoters' first mistake was in the matter of timeliness．The saturation point for new stock issues had been reached by the market，and they should have seen it．But even then they might have made a fair profit after all if they had not tried to duplicate the unreasonable killings which other promoters had made at the very height of the boom． Now you must not run away with the notion that Jim Barnes and his associates were fools or inexperienced kids．They were shrewd men．All of them were familiar with Wall Street methods and some of them were exceptionally successful stock traders．But they did rather more than merely overestimate the public's buying capacity． After all，that capacity was something that they could determine only by actual tests．Where they erred more expensively was in expecting the bull market to last longer than it did． I suppose the reason was that these same men had met with such great and particularly with such quick success that they didn't doubt they'd be all through with the deal before the bull market turned．They were all well known and had a considerable following among the professional traders and the wire houses． wire houses．The deal was extremely well advertised．The newspapers certainly were generous with their space．The older concerns were identified with the stove industry of America and their product was known the world over．It was a patriotic amalgamation and there was a heap of literature in the daily papers about the world conquests．The markets of Asia，Africa and South America were as good as cinched． 其他版本译文(463)： 公司人士行事的第一个错是没有掌握好时机。新股在市场流通中已经饱和，他们应该知道这个，可即使这样，他们若不想像其他公司那样，得到在股市最景气的时候能得到的高额利润，也就能够赚到不小一笔资金了。 你不能轻易说吉姆和合伙人是一群笨蛋或经验欠缺的毛头小子。他们可都是精明的成年人，对华尔街上的一切手段都很清楚，有的人甚至是非常出色的股票交易者。可是他们的所作所为，却不光是高估了股民们的购买力。毕竟，他们在实打实地进行市场测试前，是没办法判断购买力有多少的。他们更严重的错是想着让多头市场持续时间更长一些。我觉得，可能是因为他们曾经都成功地做过交易，尤其是在快速操作而赚钱方面成就突出，从而致使他们对自己能够在多头市场疲软之前就赚到钱充满信心。他们都名气不小，在业内的专业交易者和证券经纪商当中都有粉丝。 这个事例的宣传很到位，报纸确实非常大方，报道了一大篇内容，提到那三家公司是美国炉具产业的范本，产品在世界上都很有名气，合并三家公司，是爱国主义行为。日报上发表了很多报道，说他们在世界范围内是如何开疆拓土的，已经在亚非拉地区的市场中站稳了脚跟。 我的译文(463)： 这些发起人的第一个错误就是时机不对。新股发行的市场已经饱和了，他们应该也已经看出来了，但即便如此，他们的浮盈也已相当不错了，但毕竟不如其他人在繁荣巅峰时期的暴利，(于是他们还是觉得心有不甘，没有及时了结)。 你可不要以为Jim Barnes和他的伙伴们蠢，或者把他们当成没有经验的年轻人。 他们可是精明人，而且是知名人物，有相当多的专业交易员与电报经纪商都是他们的粉丝。 对华尔街的套路他们全都门儿清，其中一些人本身就是特别成功的股票交易员。通过测试市场，他们可以知道公众的购买力，所以令他们付出昂贵代价的，绝不只是高估公众的购买力，而是(主观上)抱有不切实际的幻想，想让牛市(为了他们)而走的更久一点。 我估计是他们成功的太快了，收获也颇丰，以至于他们太过自信，自信自己一定能在牛市转向前，达成预期的操盘目标。 他们为此做了特别充分的宣传，报纸也确实慷慨的为他们提供了宣传阵地。 美国炉灶制造业的标志性老牌企业，其产品享誉全球。日报上充斥着大量这样的报道，甚至把这场合并上升到了爱国的高度，因为这有利于让美国的企业占领全球市场。亚洲、非洲和南美洲的市场都不在话下。 引用依据： 1. Edwin Lefèvre: Reminiscences of a Stock Operator 2. 《股票大作手回忆录》（[美] 埃德温·勒菲弗 著，汤前燕 译） 上一集:

经典重译之股票大作手回忆录(423)

原文(453)： I myself was confident that the bull market was over．I had verified my first surmise by tests not alone in Pete Products but in other stocks as well．I didn't wait for the bear market to announce its safe arrival before I started selling．Of course I didn't sell a share of Pete Products，though I was short of other stocks． The Pete Products pool，as I expected，was hung up with all they held to begin with and with all they had to take in their futile effort to hold up the price．In the end they did liquidate；but at much lower figures than they would have got if Prentiss had let me sell when and as I wished． It could not be otherwise．But Prentiss still thinks he was right—or says he does．I understand he says the reason I gave him the advice I did was that I was short of other stocks and the general market was going up．It implies，of course，that the break in Pete Products that would have resulted from selling out the pool's holdings at any price would have helped my bear position in other stocks． That is all tommyrot．I was not bearish because I was short of stocks．I was bearish because that was the way I sized up the situation，and I sold stocks short only after I turned bearish．There never is much money in doing things wrong end to；not in the stock market． 其他版本译文(453)： 我坚信多头市场已近尾声，我不光用油品公司测试了市场，也通过买卖其他股票进行了测试，为我起初的猜测给以验证。我不会在完全属于空头市场的时候才去放空股票。至于油品公司，我自然一股都没卖，只放空了其他的股票。 就像我想的那样，油品公司把他们一开始就有的股票和为了拉抬股价却丝毫作用没起而买进的股票全部抱在了怀里，最终的结果还是卖掉了股票，可与布兰迪不让我卖的那个时候相比，他们卖出的价格更低。这不可能有其他结果，可布兰迪还是觉得他们没错，或者他自己没做错。我清楚的是，他说我向他提意见，是因为我放空了其他的股票，可是股市依然是上升趋势。这明显是在说，如果没有进行限价就买完手中的股票，会让油品公司股票暴跌，这样会帮助我在其他股票的空头部位。 这纯粹是信口开河。我不看好股市行情，并非我放空了股票，而是因为我预估股市大盘的发展走向就是这样，我只有在自己从做多转为做空的时候，才会放空。朝着错的方向走，不会有钱可赚，尤其是炒股。 我的译文(453)：  我本人是坚信牛市到头了。这之前，对于我最初的推测，我就已经做过检验，我不仅测试了Pete Products的市场，也测试了其他的股票。我在熊市初露端倪时就已经开始卖出了。(译者注：原文字面意思是：我没有等到熊市确定无疑时，再开始卖出。由此可以看出，利弗莫尔这是在抄底摸顶啊！那么到底该不该抄底摸顶呢？) 当然，Pete Products的股票我一股都没有卖，尽管我已经做空了其他的股票。 不出我所料，Pete Products 的庄家被套住了，手里所有的筹码都被套住了，包括初始持仓，以及为了护盘而不得不吃进的筹码。妄图以此来支撑股价，却徒劳无功，最终，他们也只能被迫平仓，而平仓的价格可比之前低多了，如果之前Prentiss听了我的，那会儿就卖，他们本可以拿到更好的价格。 不可能有别的结果，但Prentiss仍然觉得他是对的，或者说口头上他是不承认自己搞错了。 他认为市场正在上涨，而我之所以建议他卖，是因为我自己在做空其他股票，我理解他说的这些理由，他的话外音就是，不问价格的抛售他们持仓的这只股票，造成该股大跌，有利于我在其他股票上的空头仓位。 这纯粹是无稽之谈，我可不是因为有了空头仓位才看空市场的，我是基于对大势的研判，才看空市场的，而因为我先转向看空市场，所以我才建立的空头仓位。如此因果颠倒，本末倒置，不只在股票市场上挣不到钱，在其他领域一样不行。 引用依据： 1. Edwin Lefèvre: Reminiscences of a Stock Operator 2. 《股票大作手回忆录》（[美] 埃德温·勒菲弗 著，汤前燕 译） 上一集:

经典重译之股票大作手回忆录(434)

原文(464)： The directors of the company were all men whose names were familiar to all readers of the financial pages．The publicity work was so well handled and the promises of unnamed insiders as to what the price was going to do were so definite and convincing that a great demand for the new stock was created．The result was that when the books were closed it was found that the stock which was offered to the public at fifty dollars a share had been oversubscribed by 25 per cent． Think of it！The best the promoters should have expected was to succeed in selling the new stock at that price after weeks of work and after putting up the price to 75 or higher in order to average 50．At that，it meant an advance of about 100 per cent in the old prices of the stocks of the constituent companies．That was the crisis and they did not meet it as it should have been met．It shows you that every business has its own needs．General wisdom is less valuable than specific savvy．The promoters，delighted by the unexpected than specific savvy．The promoters，delighted by the unexpected oversubscription，concluded that the public was ready to pay any price for any quantity of that stock．And they actually were stupid enough to underallot the stock．After the promoters made up their minds to be hoggish they should have tried to be intelligently hoggish． 其他版本译文(464)： 阅读报纸财经版的读者们都知道，这家公司的董事都是非常著名的人物。公关工作搞得好，公司内部没有署名的人也做了承诺，说股价一定会呈现出什么样的结果，非常肯定且有说服力，所以为新发行的股票搭建了很大的市场需求。最终在申购完了以后，按照50美元公开销售的股票，认购量超出了四分之一。 你想啊，公司使了好几周的劲儿，把股价提升到了75美元以上，平均股价也达到了50美元以上，能够看到的最好结果是按照这样的价位，把所有新股都卖出去。以这个价位释股，说明合并了的几家公司的股票原来的价格大概翻了一番。这是一次危机，他们本该做出应对措施，却纹丝不动。这说明每个行业都有自身的特殊需求，常人的眼光没有专业人士的眼光那么有价值。公司的人因为股票被超额认购而非常高兴，他们很确定地以为，不论它的价格高到多少，发行多少股，人们都会拿着金钱没有节制地买进。他们真是愚蠢至极，竟然没有足额配售准备减持给大众的股票。公司内部决定要贪心时，也应该贪得稍微聪明点儿呀。 我的译文(464)： 报纸财经版面的所有读者，对于这家公司董事们的大名，全都耳熟能详。他们的宣传工作做的非常好。 由于匿名的公司内部人，对股价将会如何发展，给出了明确而令人信服的承诺，以至于催生了对这只新股的巨大需求，结果就是，认购登记结束的时候，他们发现，以每股五十美元向公众发售的这只股票，认购规模达到了发售规模的1.25倍。 (公众对这支新股的热情)，可以说超出了他们当初的期待，之前他们预期最好的结果是，通过几周的控盘操作，把股价拉到75美元或更高，然后出货，出货的平均价格能达到50美元，就算是成功。 即便按他们这个想法，50美元的价格，也比他们合并前各自的股价高出了一倍。 于是这些发起人，被超出预期的超额认购冲昏了头脑，得出结论：公众愿意为这支股票的任意数量开出任意的价格。 (以他们的经验)，遇到这种事他们本该知道咋处理，做生意得考虑现实情况，得具体问题具体分析，不能教条，(而他们却被希望中的暴利蒙蔽了双眼)，愚蠢到了惜售的地步，不是趁热打铁赶快派发，(却想留着这些股票下崽儿呢！)，他们这么做，就给自已埋下了一个大雷，这不是精明的谋利，而是标准的贪婪。 引用依据： 1. Edwin Lefèvre: Reminiscences of a Stock Operator 2. 《股票大作引用依手回忆录》（[美] 埃德温·勒菲弗 著，汤前燕 译） 上一集:

经典重译之股票大作手回忆录(429)

(原文第二十一章最后一个桥段) 原文(459): In every boom companies are formed primarily if not exclusively to take advantage of the public's appetite for all kinds of stocks．Also there are belated promotions．The reason why promoters make that mistake is that being human they are unwilling to see the end of the boom．More-over，it is good business to take chances when the possible profit is big enough．The top is never in sight when the vision is vitiated by hope． The average man sees a stock that nobody wanted at twelve dollars or fourteen dollars a share suddenly advance to thirty—which surely is the top—until it rises to fifty．That is absolutely the end of the rise．Then it goes to sixty；to seventy；to seventy-five．It then becomes a certainty that this stock，which a few weeks ago was selling for less than fifteen，can't go any higher．But it goes to eighty；and to eighty-five．Whereupon the average man，who never thinks of values but of prices，and is not governed in his actions by conditions but by fears，takes the easiest way—he stops thinking that there must be a limit to the advances．That is why those outsiders who are wise enough not to buy at the top make up for it by not taking profits．The big money in booms is always made first by the public—on paper．And it remains on paper． 其他版本译文(459): 每一次市场繁荣的时候，都有一批公司冒出来，即便它们出现的原因不全是想借助人们强大的购买力赚钱，但至少主要原因是这样。有的人犹豫很久才把股票拿出来承销。承销公司出现这样的失误，原因是他们也只是人而已，不想让繁荣的现实离去。而且，只要潜在利润能大的话，就值得冒险一试。当希望遮挡了视线的时候，你就没办法看清头部。普通人见一只12美元或者14美元没人买的股票一下子涨到了30美元，以为这就是最高点了，可它却又上升到了50美元，这就必定是到了上涨的顶部了，可接着它又涨到60美元、70美元，然后到75美元。这样的局面能够确定了，几周前还是15美元，现在肯定不再涨了。可是，它又涨到了80美元，接着是85美元。此时，大多数普通股民都只想的是价格，而不去思考它应有的价值，同时他们的行动不是由情势主导，而是由恐惧主导，所以他们就采用了最容易的方式，不再觉得涨势会到头。就因为这个原因，不懂行的人可能虽然非常聪明，不在头部买进股票，但是也不获利落袋。市场繁荣景气的时候，人们总是先赚到很多账面上的利润，而最终只能把它们保持在账面上。 我的译文(459): 每一轮繁荣的到来，都会催生出新的公司，(我认为这就是)意图利用公众对各类股票的强烈需求，这即便不是全部原因，也是主要原因。(而利用大众就有个火候的问题，得趁热打铁)，而有的推销活动就赶的时候不好，为时已晚，这种情况也是存在的。 新公司的发起人为啥会犯这样的错误呢？因为作为人类，(他们会被自己的情感左右)，(从情感上)他们不想看到繁荣的落幕。此外，当潜在利益足够丰厚时，他们就认为这是一桩值得去冒险的好买卖。当视线被(不切实际)的希望所蒙蔽时，他们根本就看不见顶部(译者注:希望与恐惧是两种人类固有的情感，当希望的情绪主宰一个人时，他就好比埋头的鸵鸟，主观上就不想看到，不愿承认顶部的到来。) 当一支股票的价格处于十二或十四美元时，没人想买它，可突然它就涨到了三十美元，—般人认为这肯定就是顶点了——结果它又继续涨到了五十。(译者注:这里的一般人还沉浸在恐惧中，恐高。) 这回绝对是涨到头了吧？可它接着又涨到了60，70，75(美元)。此时他们会确定无疑的认定：它不可能再涨得更高了，因为就在几周前它还不到十五美元。但是它又冲到了80，然后是85。 一般人只是盯着价格，从来不考虑价值，支配他们行动的不是客观条件，而是主观上的恐惧，于是他们的思维走上了最小阻力路径，最省事的办法就是不再考虑上涨是否终有尽头。 那些足够精明的圈外人，虽然不会在顶部买入，但他们也不出场落袋为安，(就是因为这种心理)，(鸵鸟心态)抵消了他们原本的精明之处。 繁荣之下，大众起初总是能赚到大钱的，但只是账面上的浮盈，最终却化作了泡影，只是曾经出现在账面上而已。 引用依据： 1. Edwin Lefèvre: Reminiscences of a Stock Operator 2. 《股票大作手回忆录》（[美] 埃德温·勒菲弗 著，汤前燕 译） 上一集：

经典重译之股票大作手回忆录(436)

原文(466)： There is no need to go into statistical details．The price of Consolidated Stove fluctuated with the rest of the market，but it never went above the initial market quotations，which were only a fraction above 50．Barnes and his friends in the end had to come in as buyers in order to keep it above 40．Not to have supported that stock at the outset of its market career was regrettable．But not to have sold all the stock the public subscribed for was much worse． At all events，the stock was duly listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the price of it duly kept sagging until it nominally stood at 37．And it stood there because Jim Barnes and his associates had to keep it there because their bank had loaned them thirty-five dollars a share on one hundred thousand shares．If the bank ever tried to liquidate that loan there was no telling what the price would break to．The public that had been eager to buy it at 50，now didn't care for it at 37，and probably wouldn't want it at 27． As time went on the banks' excesses in the matter of extensions of credits made people think．The day of the boy banker was over．The banking business appeared to be on the ragged edge of suddenly relapsing into conservatism．Intimate friends were now asked to pay off loans，for all the world as though they had never played golf with the president． 其他版本译文(466)： 没必要再说那些详细的统计数字了，联合炉具股票的价格与股市中的其他股票一样，波动起伏着。不过再也没有高过一开始上市时稍高于50美元的价格。吉姆和他的合伙人最终只好买进，以便把股价稳定在40美元以上。在刚刚上市时不支持这只股票，这让人觉得非常遗憾和可惜。可是，没有把股民们认购的股票全部销售出去，这是更加失败的举动。 总而言之，这只新股票在纽交所顺利地挂牌，然后股价也很自然地在下滑，直至以37美元的价格停住才罢。股价能够在这个价格上停止，是因为吉姆及其合伙人必须把股价顶到这个价位上。他们合作的银行质押了10万股，按照每股35美元向他们借了钱，假如银行想要斩断股票收回贷款，那还真难说准股价会跌成什么样子。人们在50美元的时候急着往进买，如今跌成37美元了，反而对它没了任何兴趣，或许就算跌到27美元都还会是无人搭理的状态。 时间长了，人们就开始思索银行大量往外放款的事。青年银行家们的日子临近尾声了，银行业好像面临着重要转折，仿佛在猛然之间，就要回归原来那种谨慎保守的状态。那些本来和银行家非常亲近和友好的人，如今被银行家追着要债，让他无论如何都要还款，好像双方之间以前从来没有一起玩过高尔夫一般。 我的译文(466)： Consolidated Stove 随同市场上的其他股票一起波动，即便是把每一天的波动细节都统计出来也没用，上市第一天的开盘价，就是它的最高点，而那个价位也不过比50(美元)高了一点儿。(而后来)Barnes和他的朋友们，为了把股价维持在40以上，最终不得不进场充当买方。没能在上市之初，就对该股进行护盘，这固然遗憾，(但居然还要惜售)，不让公众足额得到他们认购的份额，相比前者，这种做法要糟糕的多。 不管怎样吧，这只股票如期在纽约证券交易所挂牌上市了，而股价也如期持续下跌，看起来会稳定在37(美元)。股价之所以停在这里，是因为Jim Barnes 及其合伙人不得不守住这个价位，因为他们为了获得银行贷款，质押了十万股的股票，质押价格是每股35美元。如果银行试图收回贷款，股价将跌成什么样，那可就不好说了。之前公众为了买到它，愿意出50美元，现在跌到37美元都没人乐意买，估计跌倒27，也没人想要。 随着时间的推移，银行在信贷方面的过度扩张，使得人们心生疑虑。年轻银行家的时代结束了。银行业再一次站到了悬崖边上，往前一步就将重回银根紧缩的时代。 即使是行长的好朋友，即使一起打过高尔夫，(那也没用)，一样被催着还贷。 引用依据： 1. Edwin Lefèvre: Reminiscences of a Stock Operator 2. 《股票大作引用依手回忆录》（[美] 埃德温·勒菲弗 著，汤前燕 译） 上一集: